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ABSTRACT 
 
The rise of the New Economy has restructured work, necessitated changing 
skills requirements, as well as spurred new training needs amongst employees. 
Such new skills and training needs are prerequisites to survive and thrive in the 
New Economy. Importantly, these skills and training are also prerequisites for 
upward mobility in a system of inequality. This paper illustrates the case of 
Malaysian tellers as the Malaysian banking industry operates in the New 
Economy. Although the New Economy and the emergence of the sales culture 
requires Malaysian tellers to be more knowledgeable, this paper argues that due 
to their unionised status and given their positions at the bottom rung of the 
occupational hierarchy, tellers in Malaysia are disadvantaged and often excluded 
in the process of training and knowledge acquisition.   
 
 
hat is the ‘New Economy’? As scholars argue, it is a vague and 
often “overused” term, given its diverse meaning to different 
people (Cain 2006: A3). Perhaps best summarized by the Canadian 
Centre for Research on Work and Society’s flagship project ‘Restructuring Work 
in the New Economy’, the New Economy bears four key attributes, namely, a) 
the rise of the service economy; b) knowledge, skills, education and training; c) 
information and communication technologies (ICTs); and d) contingent work (i.e., 
part-time, casual, temporary workers) (Pupo and Thomas 2010). Another 
prominent scholarly contribution is found in Larner and Le Heron’s (2002) study 
of the globalizing retail banking sector in New Zealand. According to them, 
scholarly discourses in the last two decades have shifted and emphasized the 
erosion of old spaces (i.e., nation-states, societies, national economies) and the 
emergence of new spaces and processes for social subjects like citizens, workers, 
mothers and children. As such, their study discloses the emergence of multiple 
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economic and social spaces in which these social subjects now become visible. As 
a contemporary concept, the emergence of the New Economy has initiated 
revolutionary changes in the modern workplace, as evidenced by the 
transformations, organizational/management changes, responses and multi-
dimensional impacts that, in one way or another, have wrought irreversible 
changes to work and the lives of people. 
However, it is pertinent to ask whether the New Economy is predominantly a 
Western phenomenon which impacts the work and lives of people in advanced 
economies, or if it is a universal concept affecting every human being in this 
globalised world? This paper seeks to understand what this label—“New 
Economy”—means to an emerging Malaysian economy.  
In the quest to be a developed nation by 2020, Malaysian national blueprints 
and corporate charters have called for the development of high value-added 
production methods, greater adoption of ICTs in the workplace and a highly-
talented, multi-skilled and adaptable Malaysian workforce in order to weather 
the volatile global environment (Malaysia 2006). More significantly, with 
Malaysia’s aspiration to mobilise the service sector as the ”new engine of 
economic growth” (MOF 2008), this study has identified Malaysia’s key service 
sector—banking—as a  case study to juxtapose how the New Economy has 
modified work in this industry. Indeed, such changes and modifications will 
require contemporary bank employees to develop new skills and request extra 
training. With Western banking studies (CEDEFOP 2003; Illeris 1996, 2002; 
Baethge, D’Alessio & Oberbeck 1999: 302) reporting that those most impacted 
and affected by the New Economy are found at the bottom rung of the 
occupational hierarchy, this study of Malaysian banks attempts to flesh-out the  
challenges faced by Malaysian tellers seeking to survive in the New Economy.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The fieldwork for this research was undertaken in Malaysa during two 
periods. Initial data collection was conducted during seven months, from 
January to July 2008. A subsequent round took place in February 2009 in order to 
address outstanding issues, missing links and gaps identified in prior data 
collection. A mixed research method combining quantitative and qualitative 
research techniques was employed in this study. However, for the purpose of 
this paper, the discussion revolves around the findings obtained through 
qualitative interviews.  
For the qualitative component, a “purposeful sampling strategy” (Patton 
2002: 46) was applied to select the study sites, case study banks and respondents. 
Two major domestic Malaysian commercial banks in Kuala Lumpur and George 
Town were identified as study sites, from which 12 branches were investigated.  
Six branches were in urban and suburban districts of Kuala Lumpur and another 
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six in urban and suburban districts of George Town. A total of 68 bank 
employees from various levels of management (i.e., senior managers, branch 
managers, bank officers/executives, tellers) were interviewed, of which 16 were 
tellers. Interestingly, the 28 bank officers/executives and 12 branch managers 
interviewed had also once worked as tellers. The input from these 
officers/executives was particularly valuable in relaying and reconstructing 
traditional work processes while also providing insight into the changing work 
patterns of Malaysian banking employees. 
 
UNIVERSAL BANKS AND MALAYSIAN TELLERS 
 
As in Western economies, the world of banking has changed radically in 
Malaysia following the emergence of Universal Banking—a development in 
response to banking restructuring which followed the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
A three phase Financial Sector Master Plan (2001-2010) was also devised to chart 
the future of the Malaysian banking industry, in anticipation of greater 
competition following liberalization measures set for 2010. Other responses 
included consolidation, as well as the merger and acquisition of banking and 
financial institutions in Malaysia. In 2003, a major policy reform marked a 
turning point in the Malaysian banking history. The reform was an amendment 
to the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA) and the formulation 
of an integrated commercial bank and finance company (BAFIN) framework 
(BNM 2005).  
Simply put, BAFIN permitted “the merger of commercial banks and finance 
companies within a domestic banking group into a single legal entity”, effective 
15 January 2004 (BNM 2005: 110). Most pertinently, this single entity was granted 
dual licences to perform the functions of a bank and finance company. As such, 
banks were permitted to promote and sell products that carry hybrid 
characteristics crossed between banking, insurance, or even investment goods. 
As the boundaries between financial and non-financial institutions broke down, 
this new scenario created a platform for transformation that irrevocably changed 
Malaysian banking.  
The Malaysian banking industry quickly witnessed the presence of various 
forms of new competitors. This was a crucial period in which Malaysian banks 
had to address domestic and foreign competition, in addition to the introduction 
of Islamic banks within the sector. Additional pressure was exerted by the 
presence of non-banking establishments such as investment and insurance 
companies, retail outlets (i.e., Tesco, Sunshine Group), and telecommunication 
companies (i.e., Digi, Maxis, Celcom), all of which now offered products and 
services once exclusively provided by banks.  
These macro changes were encapsulated at the branch-level by 
organizational changes and new management policies, as the Universal Banking 
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model became the new mission and vision for Malaysian banks. The most 
distinct impact of the Universal Bank model was the birth of a ‘sales culture’, 
which transformed Malaysian bank branches into sales platforms to launch and 
sell a plethora of diversified ‘new’ banking products. In doing so, branch 
employees were inadvertently transformed into salespersons. This model has 
also posed new challenges to contemporary Malaysian bank employees, as new 
management strategies undermined traditional work patterns and employer-
employee relationships. This aspect of the transformation is discussed in the 
following sections. 
Table 1 summarises, compares and contrasts the changing work patterns in 
Malaysian banking as it evolves from a traditional Fordist transaction-based 
production method to the Universal Banking model that leverages high-
performance work order. Empirically, this study identified that the business 
model of modern-day Malaysian banking has evolved from transaction-based 
‘commercial banking,’ which is akin to repetitive work division in a typical 
Fordist assembly line, to ‘Universal Banking,’ which emphasises sales and 
marketing. Instead of just accepting deposits or granting loans, Malaysian banks 
now promote and leverage financial planning and wealth management. 
Traditionally, banking work only involved ‘operations and services;’ but now, a 
third component—sales and marketing—has emerged as institutions shift from 
credit-based to market-based organizations. As a result, income is no longer 
generated based on interest, but via fees obtained from the sale of banking 
products. This change has also impacted employee remuneration, as bank 
employees are now remunerated based on individual performance instead of 
receiving a standard fringe benefit. Significantly, the distinct separation between 
operations and sales has collapsed, as contemporary banking work focuses more 
on consumption rather than production. A distinctive change has set-in where 
customers no longer visit the bank, but bank employees need to be proactive in 
seeking out clients. The shift to the sales culture has resulted in physical changes 
in the spatial organization of contemporary bank branches, where the 
introduction of open-plan concepts allows for the integration of backroom and 
frontline activities. With regards to management-employee relations, these have 
been transformed from Braverman’s (1974) ‘control and execute’ mode to Brown 
and Lauder’s (2001) ‘collective intelligence’ which emphasizes the ‘mutual 
dependence’ of working and learning together.  
The situation becomes doubly challenging when every branch is now given a 
collective sales target to achieve. In the New Economy, Malaysian banks have 
adopted the Performance Measurement System (PMS) to gauge an employee’s 
performance. Every individual employee is now evaluated based on their 
individual Key Performance Index (KPI).  
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Table 1 
Changing Patterns of Work in Malaysian Banking 
ELEMENTS CHANGING PATTERNS OF WORK 
 TRADITIONAL BANKING UNIVERSAL BANKING 
Business model 
Commercial banking/ 
Investment banking 
Universal banking/ 
Bancassurance 
Banking culture Traditional transaction-based 
Sales and marketing 
(One-stop financial supermarket) 
Core banking function Deposit-taking, loan-extending 
Financial planning and wealth 
management 
Core banking 
operations 
Operations and compliance  
services (2 components) 
Operations and compliance  
services  sales and marketing 
(3 components) 
Organisation type Credit-based organisation Market-based organisation 
Income generator Interest-based income 
Fee-based income (which 
accentuates importance of sales 
and marketing) 
Employee remuneration 
system 
Standard fringe benefits for all 
Performance Measurement 
System (PMS) and KPI-driven 
Job/task segregation 
Distinct segregation between 
operations and sales work 
Blurred demarcation between 
operations and sales work 
Driver of corporate 
organisation 
Production Consumption 
Customer banking 
patterns 
Customers visit the bank in 
person 
Bank employees go out to look 
for customers and tout for 
business 
Branch layout 
Physical segregation between 
backroom and frontline activities 
Integration of backroom and 
frontline activities. Open-plan 
concept without backroom 
activities. 
Management-employee 
relations 
Control and execute  Collective intelligence 
Source: Author’s fieldwork survey, 2008 
 
The PMS has a direct bearing on career advancement for contemporary 
Malaysian bank employees, as all promotion and remuneration is based on 
‘performance’. The situation becomes rather daunting when the ‘sales’ 
component is also incorporated within these KPIs. With the rise of the sales 
culture, every branch employee, regardless of occupational hierarchy, is assigned 
an ‘individual sales quota’ which forms part of their KPI. This simply means that 
with ‘sales’ now being part of their KPIs, all bank employees, regardless of rank 
or seniority, are required to do ‘sales’. According to one senior area retail 
manager, unlike before, where Malaysian bank employees enjoyed a standard 
fringe benefit that was often “seen as given” and extended to all, the scenario has 
changed radically. For instance, bank management has removed all benefits and 
perks to branch managers. This is to ensure no abuse of power/resources and to 
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curtail expenditures. According to him, management believes that “too good fringe 
benefits” will stifle performance.1  
This notion is in line with service proponents (Fuch 1968; Bryson, Daniels 
and Warf 2004) who argue that modern, high-performance workplaces, 
especially those related to service industries, will normally have low levels of 
unionisation amongst employees. In this study, a majority of the bank employees 
interviewed were not unionised. Most of the officer-level employees refrained 
from registering as members of the Association of Bank Officers Malaysia 
(ABOM). Only low-level employees (i.e., clerical and non-clerical staff) signed-up 
as members of the National Union of Banking Employees (NUBE). This 
phenomenon is shaped by neo-liberal employment legislations imposed by the 
New Economy work model where the preference is for employees to decline 
union membership.  
Neo-liberal reforms will tend to accentuate the role of capital and contend for 
the diminishing role of the State. Moreover, the voice of labour is normally not 
featured in this approach. The findings from this study point to a situation where 
there is evidence of the ‘developmental corporatism’ model (Sung 1998) which 
involves the three-way representation and relationship of State-capital-labour 
pertaining to matters of industrial relations and skills formation. However, as 
theorists note, although labour is now featured in this model, there are three key 
attributes of developmental corporatism that suggest the submissive and 
suppressed role of labour (Sung 1998: 92). Firstly, ‘reciprocity of decision’ only 
happens between the State and capital when only these two stakeholders have 
‘equal access’ in decision-making. Secondly, any consensus is based only on 
mutual ‘interdependence’ between the State and capital which excludes labour. 
And thirdly, labour assumes a subordinate role to the State and capital. 
Inevitably, low levels of unionisation amongst employees further compound 
the receding role of unions. To illustrate this trend, a brief account of the 
Malaysian scenario and its political economy will be discussed here. Though 
there is evidence of the developmental corporatism model, the presence and role 
of labour are weak and almost invisible in Malaysia’s banking industry. The 
scenario in Malaysia is such where a high percentage of clericals, non-clericals 
(i.e., messengers) and Special Grade Clerks will voluntarily become members of 
the National Union of Banking Employees (NUBE), whilst most executives and 
officers interviewed are not unionised and are not interested in becoming 
members of the Association of Bank Officers Malaysia (ABOM). Thus, it is a 
scene where merely lower-level banking employers are still unionised whilst 
executives refrain from becoming union members. This situation in Malaysia is 
consistent with Western literature where a New Economy workplace has low 
labour unionisation and trade unionists have minimal power to lobby (Brown & 
Labour 2001). This is caused by ‘enterprise bargaining’ replacing ‘collective 
bargaining’ (Bryson, Daniels & Warf 2004). 
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The abstinence of most Malaysian bank employees from joining their unions 
has invariably weakened the union body. The role of bank unions is further 
undermined since they are not included in the training process. When asked who 
should assume the greatest role towards training in the New Economy, the union 
leader was in favour of a collaborative role between the State, capital and labour. 
Nonetheless, reality portrays a different picture altogether when the union leader 
lamented: 
 
I think it should be a collaborative role. It should be tripartite, all these three parties 
including the union. It is not happening in Malaysia. It is a direction and one of those 
areas that NUBE is working towards now. We want to have tripartite relationship 
towards training with the employers, union and the government (including BNM). 
That will help a lot because the union does not know what the bank is doing and 
vice-versa. BNM does not know what NUBE and the banks are doing unless there is 
a dispute. If all of us three work together, I think we can create a lot of skillful people. 
We should bring all three parties together. There is more to gain than to lose (Union 
Leader of Banking Trade Union; interviewed on 23 May 2008).  
 
Except for unionised bank employees (i.e., tellers, clericals), Malaysian bank 
employers have negotiated with non-unionised members to surrender their 
benefits. The situation is aggravated where two or more different Malaysian 
banks merge and consolidate. The interests of employees are often forsaken 
because they have no choice but to give up their benefits when their respective 
banks merge. It began with Malaysian branch managers foregoing their benefits 
whenever two or more different banks merged. Later, those in the ‘Executive’ 
and ‘Grade 34’ categories finally gave up their bonuses too. Presently, the last 
bastions that still receive bonuses are clerical and non-clerical bank employees. 
They continue to receive contractual bonuses simply because they are still 
unionised.  
However, during the time of this study (January to June 2008), ongoing 
negotiations were underway between Malaysian bank employers, represented by 
the Malayan Commercial Banks’ Association (MCBA), and the National Union of 
Banking Employees (NUBE), who championed the rights of clerical and non-
clerical employees. Amongst the issues under negotiation were contractual 
bonuses and doing sales at work. Apparently, members of NUBE (i.e., tellers) 
were advised against doing sales since the sales and marketing component was 
not written in their collective agreements. This resulted in a rather paradoxical 
situation for Malaysian tellers. Even though they are the first point-of-contact 
with customers, they have been discouraged by their union (i.e., NUBE) from 
doing sales. However, in reality, the shift to Universal Banking and the 
challenges/pressures of a modern high performance Malaysian bank branch 
compel tellers to do sales, especially since sales are part of their KPI. Given that 
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every level of branch employee is prescribed a sales target, tellers too have to 
achieve this goal and are not exempt from doing sales. Tellers are also put on the 
Performance Measurement System (PMS) and are evaluated based on their KPIs, 
which has a sales component. Hence, for a Malaysian teller, the dilemma is 
whether to sell or not to sell.  
With sales forming part of their KPIs, tellers who refrain from selling, or who 
find difficulty in promoting sales, will bear the brunt of receiving poor appraisals, 
which in turn determine their annual increment and other career advancement 
prospects. For worst-case scenarios where they fail to perform, tellers are given 
the ultimatum of either having to “buck up or shift out”. According to a senior 
area retail manager, tellers nowadays do not have much choice except to perform 
accordingly. He said in an indifferent tone, “If you remain as a clerical for 10 
years, we shift you out.”2 
The emergence of the sales culture also revealed that modern-day Malaysian 
tellers need substantial amounts of up-to-date banking knowledge, as well as 
conceptual skills (i.e., decision-making, problem-solving, interpersonal skills), in 
order for them to be knowledgeable enough to promote sales to their potential 
clientele. Clearly, tellers require constant training to remain updated. However, 
another unfavourable situation has emerged. Similar to banking studies in 
Western economies (O’Reilly 1994; Regini et al. 1999), this study shows that 
Malaysian bank employers have adopted labour flexibility concepts that support 
the engagement of short-term, contingent contract employees to push and 
promote the sales of the plethora of new banking products under the Universal 
Banking model.  
However, a Human Resources Head who was interviewed rationalizes the 
employment of contract employees by alleging that the “temporary nature of the 
job” will compel contract employees to be better performers and more 
competitive employees.3 This, according to them, will ensure higher productivity 
and competitiveness for their banks. Interestingly, with Malaysia’s quantitative 
expansion in tertiary education, the bulk of these contract employees are actually 
university graduates. These fresh graduates enter Malaysia’s banking industry 
carrying titles such as financial executives, relationship managers, or private 
bankers. Their portfolios are mostly, if not entirely, sales-based and sales-driven. 
However, to ensure that these ‘salespersons’ are qualified to sell the full range of 
new investment-linked and insurance products to the Malaysian masses, Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM) (The Central Bank of Malaysia) has imposed a 
compulsory ruling that these graduates-cum-banking salespersons are to be 
licensed with various up-to-date certifications such as Certified Financial 
Planning (CFP), Certified Credit Professional (CCP), and such. Due to this fact, 
the trade unionist argued that equal training opportunities for low-level 
employees are not forthcoming. Apparently bank employers have directed the 
bulk of training to this group of banking salespersons who are dominated by 
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mostly graduates, whilst forsaking tellers. Indirectly, the enormous recruitment 
of graduates to fill the positions of salespersons in Malaysia’s banking industry 
has impeded the career advancement opportunities of low-level, front-line 
employees, like tellers. Interviews with tellers and representatives from their 
trade union revealed that the adoption of workforce flexibility in the form of 
short-term contract employees has caused two types of polarisation, namely, 
training polarisation and remuneration polarisation.  
For the former, a dilemma exists in terms of skills upgrading for tellers. Even 
though Malaysian tellers now require more knowledge and skills to discharge 
their duties in the New Economy, sadly, interviews with trade unionists and 
tellers reveal that training is limited and not forthcoming to some of these front-
line employees. Thus, the call of union leaders advocating the training rights of 
tellers is not groundless.  
Even though tellers are not directly involved in the sales of new banking 
products, the current teamwork model (required amongst all levels of bank 
employees) has in fact remodelled the role of Malaysian tellers in the New 
Economy. Branch managers highlighted that the tellers’ first-point-of-contact 
with clients is viewed as extremely important by the bank’s management in the 
promotion of sales of their banking products. They disclosed that these 
encounters allow tellers to “break the ice,” then inform potential clients of any 
latest products and later lead clients to the sales team and hopefully securing a 
deal. Given that Malaysian tellers are now required to cross-sell and generate 
leads to their sales counterparts, obviously, tellers now need the relevant sales 
skills and product knowledge to aid them in their new roles. However, as this 
study illustrates, labour flexibility in the New Economy with widespread 
engagement of contract employees (to do sales) has certainly dampened training 
opportunities for low-level employees, like tellers. Training polarisation occurs 
when management prefers to train these contract employees (i.e., graduates) 
instead of their own tellers. 
To further aggravate the situation, the majority of these temporary contract 
employees display the traits of a typical New Economy employee, as they do not 
remain in a particular occupation for long. As Thurow (1999) argues, labour 
mobility is high in the New Economy. In this case, interviews with Human 
Resource Heads as well as trade unionists have highlighted that it is difficult to 
retain good contract employees. These employees, especially accomplished ones, 
tend to move on to other banks in search of new clientele and lucrative 
opportunities after they have obtained the necessary/relevant certifications (i.e., 
CFP, CCP). They also leave once they have exhausted the client database at a 
particular bank. Such acts of disloyalty were abhorred and condemned by the 
union head I interviewed. In highlighting the loyalty of his union members and 
in his quest to champion their training rights, he was of the following opinion: 
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You see, the fear for them in the bank is they fear my guys will also leave like them 
(the contract workers) once they have obtained the licence. What’s wrong with giving 
my guys this licence? I think they will be more loyal to you than the contract 
employees (Union Leader of Banking Trade Union; interviewed on 23 May 2008).  
 
Additionally, tellers were also found to be polarised in the remuneration they 
receive. It was reported that the commission that tellers receive from doing sales 
is not commensurate with their efforts. The difference in commission received by 
a graduate contract employee and a teller is disparagingly wide. It was revealed 
that for every successful sales transaction, the teller is given a 5 percent 
commission whilst their licensed/certified graduate sales colleague gets 95 
percent. The key discontentment of the trade unionist over this enormous 
disparity is expressed in his quote below: 
 
Why can’t you (the bank employer) allow my member (teller) to sit for the exam and 
have the license for her so that she can do the marketing (of sales)? So she can get the 
100% commission because her relationship with the customer goes back many years. 
Get another teller and give this permanent employee (present teller) the job of the 
licensed agent. Why do you need to hire a contract worker instead of upgrade your 
own employees (teller)? Why do my members (tellers) have to do the main job of 
breaking the ice and only get paid 5 percent of it? Because when you are marketing, 
you must know the knowledge of the product. It cannot be the case when A walks in, 
you ask him to go and see B. You must speak to A about the product. Sometimes it is 
more of a personalised approach (Union Leader of Banking Trade Union; 
interviewed on 23 May 2008).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has disclosed the issues and challenges faced by Malaysian tellers 
in the New Economy. Arguably, though policy rhetoric and burgeoning 
discourses have often equated the New Economy as an era where “knowledge, 
skills, education and training” are characteristics required to thrive and survive; 
the presence of training and remuneration polarisation amongst Malaysian 
tellers act as impediments in the creation of a highly knowledgeable, polyvalent 
and highly-skilled workforce. This leads to a key question: Has the New 
Economy created more losers amongst those at the bottom rung of the 
occupational hierarchy? In this case of Malaysian banks specifically, the quest 
towards a developed and knowledge-based economy should take into 
consideration, mobilise and reflect the goals featured in the latest national 
blueprints (i.e., New Economic Model, 10th Malaysia Plan), that is, a universal 
and total upgrading of human capital across all domains. A country cannot be 
considered as being totally developed/advanced if knowledge dissemination 
and skills upgrading are channelled to a selected group of highly-skilled 
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members of the society whilst marginalising those at the bottom rung of the 
occupational hierarchy. When deliberating matters pertaining to the broader 
social-economic aspirations of Malaysia (i.e., social inclusion, equal training 
opportunity, social equity), Malaysia’s reach to become a developed nation will 
be a giant leap closer if the training, career advancement and human capital 
needs of low-level employees such modern day tellers are given equitable and 
unsurpassed attention as accorded to their graduate counterparts. Only then, can 
a Malaysian teller stand tall with all the requisite skills and knowledge to thrive 
and survive in the Malaysian New Economy.   
 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1  Interview with Senior Area Retail Manager at Lebuh Pantai branch on 25 April 2008. 
2  Interview with Senior Area Retail Manager at Lebuh Pantai branch on 25 April 2008. 
3  Interview with Executive Vice-President (Head, Corporate Human Resource) at 
Kuala Lumpur Headquarters branch on 29 January 2008. 
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